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Abstract—In this paper, we use the witness-functions to
analyze cryptographic protocols for secrecy under nonempty
equational theories. The witness-functions are safe metrics used
to compute security. An analysis with a witness-function consists
in making sure that the security of every atomic message does
not decrease during its lifecycle in the protocol. The analysis gets
more difficult under nonempty equational theories. Indeed, the
intruder can take advantage of the algebraic properties of the
cryptographic primitives to derive secrets. These properties arise
from the use of mathematical functions, such as multiplication,
addition, exclusive-or or modular exponentiation in the
cryptosystems and the protocols. Here, we show how to use the
witness-functions under nonempty equational theories and we
run an analysis on the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol under
the cipher homomorphism. This analysis reveals that although
this protocol is proved secure under the perfect encryption
assumption, its security collapses under the homomorphic
primitives. We show how the witness-functions help to illustrate
an attack scenario on it and we propose an amended version to
fix it.
Keywords- Cryptographic protocols; Equational theories;
Homomorphism; Secrecy.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we use the witness-functions to statically
analyze cryptographic protocols with respect to secrecy under
nonempty equational theories. The Witness-Functions have
been suggested by Fattahi et al. in [1]–[7] as metrics to
attribute a safe value of security to each atomic message in the
protocol. A protocol analysis with a witness-function consists
in following every atomic message defined in the protocol and
making sure that its value of security does not fall down during
its lifecycle. In this case, the protocol is said to be increasing
-so correct- with respect to secrecy. The use of cryptographic
primitives with algebraic properties compels the verifier to
undertake special precautions when using these functions since
the cryptographic primitives supply the intruder with new
redoubtable capabilities. We organize this paper as follows:
— First, we recall the theory of increasing protocols and
we show that any protocol if proved increasing, using
reliable metrics that meet few conditions, is correct with
respect to secrecy;
— then, we present the witness-functions as reliable met-
rics and we show how to use them under nonempty
equational theories;
— then, we run a formal analysis of the Needham-
Schroeder-Lowe protocol and we show that although
this protocol was proved correct under the perfect en-
cryption assumption, it is no longer secure under the
homomorphic primitives. We show that the witness-
functions help to illustrate an attack scenario on it and
we propose a corrected version of it based on hash
functions;
— finally, we compare our method to some related works.
NOTATIONS
Here, we give the notations used throughout this paper.
+ We denote by C = 〈M, ξ, |=,K,L⊒, p.q〉 the context
of verification containing the relevant parameters for a
protocols analysis.
• M: is a set of messages built from the signature
〈N ,Σ〉 where N is a set of atomic names (nonces,
keys, principals, etc.) and Σ is a set of operators (E ::
encryption, D:: decryption, pair:: pairing (denoted
by "." here), etc.). i.e. M = T〈N ,Σ〉(X ). We use Γ
to denote the set of substitution from X to M. We
denote by A the set of atomic messages in M, by
A(m) the set of atomic messages in m, by I the set
of agents (principals) in the protocol and by I the
intruder. We denote by k−1 the reverse key of k and
we assume that (k−1)−1 = k.
• ξ: is the equational theory [8]–[11] that describes
the algebraic properties of the operators in Σ by
equations. For example, the homomorphic property
is described by {m.m′}k = {m}k.{m′}k and the
modular exponentiation property is described by
{{m}k}k′ = {{m}k′}k. Two messages m and m′
that are equivalent under the equational theory ξ are
denoted by m =ξ m
′.
• |=: is the inference system of the intruder under the
equational theory. LetM be a set of messages andm
a single message.M |=m expresses that the intruder
is able to infer m fromM using his capabilities. We
extend that notation to valid traces as follows: ρ |=
m expresses the fact that the intruder can derive m
from the trace ρ.
• K : is a function from I toM, that attributes to any
agent a set of atomic messages describing her initial
knowledge. KC(I) denotes the initial knowledge of
the intruder( or simply K(I) where the context is
evident).
• L⊒ : is the security lattice (L,⊒,⊔,⊓,⊥,⊤) used to
attribute a security level to a message. An example
of a concrete lattice is (2I ,⊆,∩,∪, I, ∅). We use
this latter in this paper.
• p.q : is a partial function that attributes a value of
security (type) to a message in M. Let M be a set
of messages and m be a sigle message. We express
by pMq ⊒ pmq the fact ∃m′ ∈M.pm′q ⊒ pmq
+ Let p be a protocol, we denote by RG(p) the set of the
generalized roles of p. A generalized role is a protocol
abstraction where the emphasis is put on a specific agent
and where every unknown message by that agent and on
which he cannot perform any verification is replaced by
a variable. Further details on the role-based specification
are available in [12]–[14]. We denote by MGp the set
of messages (ground terms and terms with variables)
generated by RG(p), byMp the set of messages that are
ground terms generated by substitution in the messages
of MGp . We denote by R
− (respectively R+) the set
of received messages (respectively sent messages) by
an agent in the role R. By convention, we reserve the
uppercases for sets or sequences and lowercases for
single items. For instance,M denotes a set of messages,
m a message, R a role consisting of a sequence of steps,
r a single step and R.r the role ending by the single step
r.
+ A valid trace is a ground term obtained by substituting
a non ground term in the generalized roles. We denote
by [[p]] the infinite set of valid traces.
+ We assume that the intruder has the full-control of
the net as described in the Dolev-Yao model [15]. We
suppose no limitation neither on the length of messages
nor on the number of interleaving sessions.
II. ABOUT THE CORRECTNESS OF INCREASING
PROTOCOLS
Hereafter, we recall a major result of the increasing pro-
tocols [1], [4]: an increasing protocol is correct with respect
to secrecy. For that, we need reliable metrics (functions) to
estimate the security of the atomic messages of a protocol.
To be reliable, a metric should meet few conditions. Here, we
give these conditions and we substantiate the correctness of
increasing protocols.
A. Reliable Functions
Definition II.1. (Well-formed Function) Let F be a
function and C be a context of verification. F is C-
well-formed iff: ∀M,M1,M2 ⊆ M, ∀α ∈ A(M):

F (α, {α}) = ⊥;
F (α,M1 ∪M2) = F (α,M1) ⊓ F (α,M2);
F (α,M) = ⊤, if α /∈ A(M).
A well-formed function F should return the bottom value
in the lattice for an atom α that appears in clear in M to
express the fact that is exposed to everybody in M . It should
return for it in the union of two sets, the minimum of the two
values calculated in each set alone. It returns the top value in
the lattice for any atom α that does appear in M to express
the fact that none could derive it from M .
Definition II.2. (Full-Invariant-by-Intruder Function) Let F
be a function and C be a context of verification. F is C-full-
invariant-by-intruder iff:
∀M ⊆ M,m ∈ M.M |=C m ⇒ ∀α ∈ A(m).(F (α,m) ⊒
F (α,M)) ∨ (pK(I)q ⊒ pαq).
An full-invariant-by-intruder function F is such that, when
it affects a security value to an atom α in a set of messages
M the intruder can never deduce from M , using his capabil-
ities, another message m in which this value decreases (i.e.
F (α,m) 6⊒ F (α,M)), except when α is deliberately destined
to the intruder (i.e. pK(I)q ⊒ pαq).
Definition II.3. (Reliable Function) Let F be a function and
C be a context of verification.
F is C-reliable iff
{
F is C-well-formed
F is C-full-invariant-by-intruder
A reliable function F is well-formed and full-invariant-by-
intruder.
Definition II.4. (F -Increasing Protocol) Let F be a function,
C be a context of verification and p be a protocol.
p is F -increasing in C iff:
∀R.r ∈ RG(p), ∀σ ∈ Γ : X →Mp we have:
∀α ∈ A(M).F (α, r+σ) ⊒ pαq ⊓ F (α,R−σ)
An F -increasing protocol generates permanently strings
such that every atomic message in has always a security value,
computed by F , higher in the sent message (i.e. in r+σ) than
it was in the received messages (i.e. in R−σ).
Theorem II.5. (Correctness of Increasing Protocols) Let F
be a C-reliable Function and p an F -increasing protocol.
p is correct with respect to secrecy.
Theorem II.5 states that a protocol is correct with respect
to secrecy when it is increasing using a reliable metric F to
compute security. Hence, if the intruder manages to obtain a
secret α, then its value computed by F is the bottom value
in the lattice because F is well-formed. This could not arise
because of the protocol rules because the protocol is increasing
on F unless the value of security of α is the bottom from the
beginning. In this case, α is not a secret. That could not arise
using the capabilities of the intruder neither since F is full-
invariant-by-intruder. Hence, the secret cannot be revealed. For
further details on the proof, please see [4].
III. BUILDING RELIABLE FUNCTIONS UNDER
EQUATIONAL THEORIES
A. Reliable Selections Under the Perfect Encryption Assump-
tion
In [1] we propose an abstract class of reliable selections
under the perfect encryption assumption that we denote by
SEKGen. Each selection S in S
EK
Gen should return for an atom α
in a message m:
1) if α is encrypted by a key k such that k is the most
external key satisfing the condition pk−1q ⊒ pαq (we
call it the external protective key), a subset among
k−1 and the atoms that travel with α under the same
protection by k (α itself is not selected);
2) for two messages joined by a function f in Σ such that f
is not an encryption by the external protective key (e.g.
pair), the union of the two subselections performed in
each message separately.
3) if α does not have a protective key in m, the bottom
value in the lattice (all the atoms);
4) if α does not appear in m, the top value in the lattice
(the empty set);
From the abstract class SEKGen, we propose three usefull
selections:
1) the selection SEKMAX : returns for an atom α in a message
m encrypted by the external protective key k, all the
principal identities under the same protection by k, in
addition to k−1;
2) the selection SEKEK : returns for an atom α in a message
m encrypted by the external protective key k, only the
key k−1;
3) the selection SEKN : returns for an atom α in a message
m encrypted by the external protective key k, all the
principal identities under the same protection by k;
B. Reliable Selections Under Equational Theories
In nonempty equational theories [8]–[11], cryptographic
primitives have algebraic properties that arise from the use of
mathematical functions like multiplication, addition, exclusive-
or or modular exponentiation in cryptosystems and protocols.
In ExampleIII.1 we provide some of these algebraic properties.
Example III.1. (Some Algebraic Properties)
— Homomorphism: is the property that leads to have
an equivalence between the two terms {m.m′}k and
{m}k.{m′}k. That is the case of the RSA pub-
lic key cryptosystems, the ElGamal cryptosystem,
the Brakerski-Gentry-Vaikuntanathan cryptosystem, the
NTRU-based cryptosystem, the Gentry-Sahai-Waters
cryptosystem, the Goldwasser–Micali cryptosystem, etc;
— Modular exponentiation: is the property that leads to
have an equivalence between the two terms {{m}k}k′
and {{m}k′}k. This is the case of the Diffie-Hellman
key agreement protocol;
— XOR cipher: in many encryption algorithms, a plaintext
is encrypted by applying the bitwise XOR operator to
each character using some key k. To decrypt the output,
applying the XOR function over with the key will cancel
out the cipher. The XOR operator is vulnerable to a
known attack since plaintext XOR ciphertext = k;
— Etc.
These properties endow the intruder with additional capa-
bilities to manipulate the protocol.
Condition III.2. (Normal form with the smallest selection)
Let S be a selection of the class SEKGen and C be a context
of verification. Let’s have a rewriting system →ξ such that
∀m ∈M, ∀α ∈ A(m) ∧ α 6∈ Clear(m), we have:
∀l→ r ∈→ξ, S(α, r) ⊆ S(α, l)
We denote by m⇓ the normal form of m in →ξ .
The condition on the rewriting system is introduced to make
sure that the selection in the normal form is the smallest among
all forms of a given message. This prevents the selection S to
select atoms that might be inserted maliciously by the intruder
by manipulating the equational theory. Hence, we are sure
that all selected atoms by S are honest and do not come by
an intruder manipulation of the message. We assume that the
equational theory in the context of verification allows always
the extraction of a convergent rewriting system that meets
Condition III.2. This is the case with the most of equational
theories used in the literature [9]–[11].
Example III.3. Let m = {α.C}kab be a message. Let us
have a context of verification that includes the homomorphic
cryptography (i.e. {α.C}kab = {α}kab .{C}kab ). In the form
{α.C}kab , the selection S(α, {α.C}kab) can select C, but in
the form {α}kab .{C}kab , the selection S(α, {α}kab .{C}kab)
cannot. We orient so the rewriting system so that it returns
the form {α}kab .{C}kab that is the normal form we choose.
C. From Selections to Reliable Functions Under Equational
Theories
Having defined the selections above, we transform them
now to security values. For that, we compose any selection
S in SEKGen with a suitable morphism ψ and this composition
leads to a reliable function F = ψ◦S. We define the morphism
as follows:
1) it returns for a principal, its identity;
2) it returns for a key k−1, if selected, the set of principals
that know it in the context of verification.
We denote by FEKMAX , F
EK
EK and F
EK
N respectively the func-
tions resulting from the compositions ψ ◦ SEKMAX , ψ ◦ S
EK
EK
and ψ ◦SEKN and we prove that these functions are C-reliable.
The main idea of the proof is that the selection for any secret
α in a message is carried out in an invariant zone (piece of
message) that could not be augmented by the intruder using the
equational theory seeing that the rewriting system is oriented
in such way that the used form of a message is the smallest and
contains always honest atoms only. This zone is in addition
protected by a protective key k that meets the condition
pK(I)q ⊒ pk−1q. That means, to alter this zone (to decrease
the security level of α), the intruder should have derived the
atomic key k−1 in advance. So, in this stage of the proof,
his knowledge should satisfy the condition pK(I)q ⊒ pk−1q.
Since the key k−1 satisfies the condition pk−1q ⊒ pαq then
the knowledge of the intruder should satisfy the condition
pK(I)q ⊒ pαq too by transitivity of the order"⊒" in a lattice.
This is accurately the definition of a full-invariant-by-intruder
function. Furthermore, these functions are also well-formed by
construction. Then, they are reliable.
Example III.4. Let α be an atom,m be a message and kab be
a key such that: pαq = {A,B, S}; m = {A.C.{α.D}kas}kab ;
k−1ab = kab, k
−1
as = kas; pkasq = {A,S}, pkabq = {A,B};
Under the perfect encryption assumption (empty equational
theory), we have:
SEKMAX(α,m) = S
EK
MAX(α, {A.C.{α.D}kas}kab) =
{A,C,D, k−1ab };
FEKMAX(α,m) = ψ ◦ S
EK
MAX(α,m) = {A,C,D}⊓pk
−1
ab q =
{A,C,D} ∪ {A,B} = {A,C,D,B}.
Under the cipher homomorphism, we have:
SEKMAX(α,m) = S
EK
MAX(α, {A.C.{α.D}kas}kab) =
SEKMAX(α, {A}kab .{C}kab .{{α.D}kas}kab) =
SEKMAX(α, {A}kab) ∪ S
EK
MAX(α, {C}kab) ∪
SEKMAX(α, {{α}kas}kab) ∪ S
EK
MAX(α, {{D}kas}kab) =
∅ ∪ ∅ ∪ {k−1ab } ∪ ∅ = {k
−1
ab };
FEKMAX(α,m) = ψ ◦ S
EK
MAX(α,m) = pk
−1
ab q = {A,B}.
In the rest of this paper, we denote by F any of the functions
FEKMAX , F
EK
EK and F
EK
N .
IV. THE WITNESS-FUNCTIONS
From Theorem II.5, if a protocol p is confirmed F -
increasing on its valid traces using a reliable function F ,
then it is correct with respect to secrecy. However, the set
of traces is not finite. In order to be able to analyze a protocol
on its finite set of the generalized roles, we have to readjust
the reliable function so that it can deal with the problem of
substitution and we seek an extra mechanism that enables us
to pass from the decision made on the generalized roles to
the same decision on the ground terms of the valid traces.
The witness-functions are designed for that purpose. But first,
let us instill the notion of derivative messages. A derivative
message is a term in the generalized roles from which we rule
out the variables. This is described by Definition IV.1.
Definition IV.1. (Derivation) A derivative message is defined
as follows:
∂Xα = α
∂Xǫ = ǫ
∂XX = ǫ
∂XY = Y
∂{X}m = ∂Xm
∂[X]m = ∂{Xm\X}m
∂Xf(m) = f(∂Xm), f ∈ Σ
∂S1∪S2m = ∂S1∂S2m
The idea now is to apply a reliable function F to derivative
messages istead of the message itself. For an atom in the
static part of a message (i.e. in ∂m), we compute its security
with no respect to variables. Else, for any content coming by
substitution of a variable X , it is computed as the variable
itself treated as a constant block. This is motivated by the
fact that if the security of the block substituting X does not
decrease, then the whole block (the global secret Xσ) is never
revealed and hence any sub-secret in it is never revealed. This
is given by Definition IV.2.
Definition IV.2. Let m ∈ MGp , X ∈ Xm and mσ be a valid
trace. For all α ∈ A(mσ), σ ∈ Γ, we denote by:
F (α, ∂[α]mσ) =


F (α, ∂m) if α ∈ A(∂m),
F (X, ∂[X]m) if α /∈ A(∂m)
and α ∈ A(Xσ).
The application in Definition IV.2 could not still be used
to analyze protocols since derivation has a serious undesirable
side-effect. Let have a look at Example IV.3:
Example IV.3. Let m1 and m2 be two messages of MGp
such that m1 = {X.α.D}kab and m2 = {C.α.Y }kab and
pαq = {A,B}. Let m = {C.α.D}kab be in a valid trace.
FEKMAX(α, ∂[α]m) =
{
{A,B,D}, if m = m1σ1|Xσ1 = C,
{A,B,C}, if m = m2σ2|Y σ2 = D
Thus, FEKMAX(α, ∂[α]m) is not even a function. (i.e. it may
return more than one value to the same input).
The witness-function in Definition IV.4 fixes this bug: it
looks for all the sources of mσ, applies the application in
Definition IV.2 and returns the minimum. This minimum must
exist and is unique in a lattice.
Definition IV.4. (Witness-Function) Let m ∈ MGp , X ∈ Xm
and mσ be a valid trace. Let p be a protocol and F be a C-
reliable Function. We define a witness-function Wp,F for all
α ∈ A(mσ), σ ∈ Γ, as follows:
Wp,F (α,mσ) = ⊓
m′∈MGp
∃σ′∈Γ.m′σ′=mσ
F (α, ∂[α]m′σ′)
A witness-function Wp,F is reliable when F is reliable. In
fact, it is easy to see that it is well-formed. It is also full-
invariant-by-intruder as the returned values (principal identi-
ties) are those returned by F on derivative messages of the
sources of mσ and derivation does not add new candidates, it
just takes away some of them (that come by substitution), but
〈1, A −→ B : {Na.A}kb〉,
〈2, B −→ A : {B.Na}ka .{B.Nb}ka〉,
〈3, A −→ B : A.B.{Nb}kb 〉.
Table I: A variation of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol
returns always elements from the same invariant area in the
message.
Since the goal of the witness-functions is to run a static
analysis of the protocol and since it still depends on the
protocol runs σ, we are going to confine the witness-functions
in two static bounds that we will use for analysis instead of the
witness-function itself. Proposition IV.5 gives these bounds.
Proposition IV.5. (Witness-Function Bounds) Let m ∈MGp .
Let F be a C-reliable function andWp,F be a witness-function.
For all σ ∈ Γ we have:
F (α, ∂[α]m) ⊒ Wp,F (α,mσ) ⊒ ⊓
m′∈MGp
∃σ′∈Γ.m′σ′=mσ′
F (α, ∂[α]m′σ′)
For a secret α in a ground term mσ, the upper-bound
F (α, ∂[α]m) computes its security from one trivial source m
in the generalized roles. The witness-function Wp,F (α,mσ)
computes it from the set of the exact sources of mσ
where m is necessarily one of them. The lower-bound
⊓
m′∈MGp
∃σ′∈Γ.m′σ′=mσ′
F (α, ∂[α]m′σ′) computes it from all the messages
that could unify withm. This set necessarily includes the set of
definition of the witness-function because the set of messages
that unify with the ground term mσ (fixed σ) is always in the
set of messages that unify with m. Unifications in the lower-
bound catch any odd principal identity inserted by the intruder.
Please notice that the upper-bound and the lower-bound do
not depend on σ and are statically computable. Theorem IV.6
provides a static criterion for secrecy using these bounds. It is a
direct result of Theorem II.5 and Proposition IV.5. This enables
a static analysis of the protocol to be run on the generalized
roles and the decision to be extended to valid traces.
Theorem IV.6. (Correctness Criterion) Let p be a protocol.
Le F be a reliable function. Let Wp,F be a witness-function.
A sufficient condition for p to be correct respect to secrecy is:
∀R.r ∈ RG(p), ∀α ∈ A(r+) we have:
⊓
m′∈MGp
∃σ′∈Γ.m′σ′=r+σ′
F (α, ∂[α]m′σ′) ⊒ pαq ⊓ F (α, ∂[α]R−)
V. NEEDHAM-SCHROEDER-LOWE PROTOCOL ANALYSIS
WITH A WITNESS-FUNCTION UNDER CIPHER
HOMOMORPHISM
Hereafter, we analyze a variant of the Needham-Schroeder-
Lowe protocol given in Table I with a witness-function.
The generalized roles of this protocol in a role-based
specification are RG(pNSL)= {A
1
G , A
2
G , B
1
G , B
2
G} where:
A1G = α.1 A −→ I(B) : {N
α
a .A}kb
A2G = α.1 A −→ I(B) : {N
α
a .A}kb
α.2 I(B) −→ A : {B.Nαa }ka .{B.X}ka
α.3 A −→ I(B) : A.B.{X}kb
B1G = α.1 I(A) −→ B : {Y.A}kb
α.2 B −→ I(A) : {B.Y }ka .{B.N
α
b }ka
B2G = α.1 I(A) −→ B : {Y.A}kb
α.2 B −→ I(A) : {B.Y }ka .{B.N
α
b }ka
α.3 I(A) −→ B : A.B.{Nαb }kb
Let us have a context of verification such that:
pAq = ⊥; pBq = ⊥; pNαa q = {A,B} (secret
shared between A and B); pNαb q = {A,B}
(secret shared between A and B); pk−1a q = {A};
pk−1b q = {B}; (L,⊒,⊔,⊓,⊥,⊤) = (2
I ,⊆,∩,∪, I, ∅);
I = {I, A,B,A1, A2,B1, B2, ...};
The set of messages generated by the protocol is MGp =
{{NA1.A1}kB1 , {B2.NA2}kA2 ,
{B3.X1}kA3 , {X2}kB4 , {Y1.A4}kB5 , {B6.Y2}kA5 ,
{B7.NB7}kA6 , {NB8}kB8 }
The variables are denoted by X1, X2, Y1 and Y2;
The static names are denoted by NA1 , A1, kB1 , B2, NA2 , kA2 ,
B3, kA3 , kB4 , A4, kB5 , B6, kA5 , B7, NB7 , kA6 , NB8 and kB8 .
After duplicates removal, MGp =
{{NA1.A1}kB1 , {B2.NA2}kA2 , {B3.X1}kA3 , {X2}kB4 ,
{Y1.A4}kB5 , {B7.NB7}kA6 , {NB8}kB8 }
Let us define the witness-function as follows:
p = Needham-Schroeder-Lowe; F = FEKMAX ;
Wp,F (α,mσ) = ⊓
m′∈MGp
∃σ′.m′σ′=mσ
F (α, ∂[α]m′σ′);
Let us denote the lower-bound of the witness-function
in Theorem IV.6 by:
W ′p,F (α, r
+) = ⊓
m′∈MGp
∃σ′∈Γ.m′σ′=r+σ′
F (α, ∂[α]m′σ′)
The principal identities in the context are not analyzed since
they are public.
The protocol is analyzed under cipher homomorphism
(i.e. {m.m′}k = {m}k.{m′}k). The smallest selection for
any α ∈ A(m.m′) is in the form {m}k.{m′}k.
The protocol is analyzed for secrecy only.
It is important to recall that this protocol has been established
correct for secrecy under the perfect encryption assumption
using the witness-functions [1] and by many other techniques.
A. Analysis of the generalized role of A
As defined in the generalized roles of p, an agent A can
participate in two subsequent sessions: Si and Sj such that j >
i. In the former session Si, the agent A receives nothing and
sends the message {Nαa .A}kb . In the subsequent session S
j ,
he receives the message {B.Nαa }ka .{B.X}ka and he sends
the message A.B.{X}kb . This is described by the following
rules:
Si :
✷
{Nαa .A}kb
Sj :
{B.Nαa }ka .{B.X}ka
A.B.{X}kb
Analysis of the messages exchanged in the session Si:
1- For Nαa :
a- On sending: r+
Si
= {Nαa .A}kb (in a sending step, the
lower-bound is used)
Nαa .{m
′ ∈MGp |∃σ
′ ∈ Γ.σ′m′ = σ′r+
Si
)}
= Nαa .{m
′ ∈MGp |∃σ
′ ∈ Γ.m′σ′ = {Nαa .A}kbσ
′)}
= {({NA1.A1}kB1 , σ
′
1), ({X2}kB4 , σ
′
2), ({Y1.A4}kB5 , σ
′
3)}
such that:

σ′1 = {NA1 7−→ N
α
a , A1 7−→ A, kB1 7−→ kb}
σ′2 = {X2 7−→ N
α
a .A, kB4 7−→ kb}
σ′3 = {Y1 7−→ N
α
a , A4 7−→ A, kB5 7−→ kb}
W ′p,F (N
α
a , {N
α
a .A}kb)
= {Definition of the lower-bound of the witness-function}
F (Nαa , ∂[N
α
a ]{NA1 .A1}kB1σ
′
1)⊓F (N
α
a , ∂[N
α
a ]{X2}kB4σ
′
2)⊓
F (Nαa , ∂[N
α
a ]{Y1.A4}kB5σ
′
3)
= {Setting the static neighborhood}
F (Nαa , ∂[N
α
a ]{N
α
a .A}kbσ
′
1) ⊓ F (N
α
a , ∂[N
α
a ]{X2}kbσ
′
2)⊓
F (Nαa , ∂[N
α
a ]{Y1.A}kbσ
′
3)
= {Definition IV.2}
F (Nαa , {N
α
a .A}kb) ⊓ F (X2, ∂[X2]{X2}kb)⊓
F (Y1, ∂[Y1]{Y1.A}kb)
= {Definition IV.1}
F (Nαa , {N
α
a .A}kb) ⊓ F (X2, {X2}kb) ⊓ F (Y1, {Y1.A}kb)
= {Normal form under homomorphism}
F (Nαa , {N
α
a }kb) ⊓ F (N
α
a , {A}kb) ⊓ F (X2, {X2}kb) ⊓
F (Y1, {Y1}kb) ⊓ F (Y1, {A}kb)
= {Since F = FEKMAX}
{B} ⊓ ⊤ ⊓ {B} ⊓ {B} ⊓ ⊤ = {B}(1.0)
b- On receiving: R−
Si
= ∅ (in a receiving step, the
upper-bound is used)
F (Nαa , ∂[N
α
a ]∅) = F (N
α
a , ∅) = ⊤ (1.1)
2- Conformity with Theorem IV.6:
From (1.0) and (1.1), we have: W ′p,F (N
α
a , {N
α
a .A}kb) =
{B} ⊒ pNαa q ⊓ F (N
α
a , ∂[N
α
a ]∅) = pN
α
a q ⊓ ⊤ = {A,B}
(1.2)
From (1.2) we have: the messages exchanged in the session
Si respect the correctness criterion set in Theorem IV.6. (I)
Analysis of the messages exchanged in the session
Sj:
1-∀X :
a- On sending: r+
Sj
= A.B.{X}kb
W ′p,F (X,A.B.{X}kb) = W
′
p,F (X,A) ⊓ W
′
p,F (X,B) ⊓
W ′p,F (X, {X}kb) = ⊤ ⊓ ⊤ ⊓ W
′
p,F (X, {X}kb) =
W ′p,F (X, {X}kb) (2.0)
∀X.{m′ ∈ MGp |∃σ
′ ∈ Γ.m′σ′ = {X}kbσ
′)}
= {({X2}kB4 , σ
′
1)} such that:
σ′1 = {X2 7−→ X, kB4 7−→ kb}
W ′p,F (X, {X}kb)
= {Definition of the lower-bound of the witness-function}
F (X, ∂[X]{X2}kB4σ
′
1)
= {Setting the static neighborhood}
F (X, ∂[X]{X2}kbσ
′
1)
= {Definition IV.2}
F (X2, ∂[X2]{X2}kb)
= {Definition IV.1}
F (X2, {X2}kb)
= {Normal form under homomorphism}
F (X2, {X2}kb)
= {Since F = FEKMAX}
{B} (2.1)
b- On receiving: R−
Sj
= {B.Nαa }ka .{B.X}ka (in a
receiving step, the upper-bound is used)
F (X, ∂[X]{B.Nαa }ka .{B.X}ka) =F (X, ∂[X]{B.N
α
a }ka) ⊓
F (X, ∂[X]{B.X}ka) =
F (X, {B.Nαa }ka) ⊓ F (X, {B.X}ka)
= {Normal form under homomorphism}
F (X, {B}ka) ⊓ F (X, {N
α
a }ka) ⊓ F (X, {B}ka) ⊓
F (X, {X}ka) =
⊤ ⊓ ⊤ ⊓⊤ ⊓ {A} = {A} (2.2)
3-Conformity with Theorem IV.6:
From (2.0), (2.1) and (2.2), we have:
W ′p,F (X,A.B.{X}kb) = {B} 6⊒ pXq ⊓
F (X, ∂[X]{B.Nαa }ka .{B.X}ka) = pXq ∪ {A} (2.3)
From (2.3), we have: the messages exchanged in the session
Sj do not respect the correctness criterion set in Theorem
IV.6. (II)
From (I) and (II), the messages exchanged in the generalized
role of A do not respect the correctness criterion set in
Theorem IV.6. (III)
B. Analysis of the generalized role of B
As defined in the generalized roles of p, an agent B can
participate in a session S′
i
, in which he receives the message
{Y.A}kb and he sends the message {B.Y }ka .{B.N
α
b }ka . This
is described by the following rule:
S′
i
:
{Y.A}kb
{B.Y }ka .{B.N
α
b }ka
1- For Nαb :
a- On sending: r+
S′
i = {B.Y }ka .{B.N
α
b }ka (in a sending step,
the lower-bound is used)
W ′p,F (N
α
b , {B.Y }ka .{B.N
α
b }ka) =W
′
p,F (N
α
b , {B.Y }ka) ⊓
W ′p,F (N
α
b , {B.N
α
b }ka) =
⊤ ⊓W ′p,F (N
α
b , {B.N
α
b }ka) =W
′
p,F (N
α
b , {B.N
α
b }ka) (3.0)
∀Nαb .{m
′ ∈MGp |∃σ
′ ∈ Γ.m′σ′ = {B.Nαb }kaσ
′)}
= {({B3.X1}kA3 , σ
′
1), ({X2}kB4 , σ
′
2), ({B7.NB7}kA6 , σ
′
3)}
such that:

σ′1 = {B3 7−→ B,X1 7−→ N
α
b , kA3 7−→ ka}
σ′2 = {X2 7−→ B.N
α
b , kB4 7−→ ka}
σ′3 = {B7 7−→ B,NB7 7−→ N
α
b , kA6 7−→ ka}
W ′p,F (N
α
b , {B.N
α
b }ka)
= {Definition of the lower-bound of the witness-function}
F (Nαb , ∂[N
α
b ]{B3.X1}kA3σ
′
1) ⊓
F (Nαb , ∂[N
α
b ]{X2}kB4σ
′
2)⊓F (N
α
b , ∂[N
α
b ]{B7.NB7}kA6σ
′
3)
= {Setting the static neighborhood}
F (Nαb , ∂[N
α
b ]{B.X1}kaσ
′
1) ⊓
F (Nαb , ∂[N
α
b ]{X2}kaσ
′
2)⊓F (N
α
b , ∂[N
α
b ]{B.N
α
b }kaσ
′
3)
= {Definition IV.2}
F (X1, ∂[X1]{B.X1}ka) ⊓ F (X2, ∂[X2]{X2}ka) ⊓
F (Nαb , ∂[N
α
b ]{B.N
α
b }ka)
= {Definition IV.1}
F (X1, {B.X1}ka) ⊓ F (X2, {X2}ka) ⊓ F (N
α
b , {B.N
α
b }ka)
= {Normal form under homomorphism}
F (X1, {B}ka) ⊓ F (X1, {X1}ka) ⊓ F (X2, {X2}ka) ⊓
F (Nαb , {B}ka) ⊓ F (N
α
b , {N
α
b }ka)
= {Since F = FEKMAX}
⊤ ⊓ {A} ⊓ {A} ⊓ {A} ⊓ ⊤ ⊓ {A} = {A} (3.1)
b- On receiving: R−
S′
i = {Y.A}kb (in a receiving step,
the upper-bound is used)
F (Nαb , ∂[N
α
b ]{Y.A}kb) = F (N
α
b , {A}kb) = ⊤ (3.2)
2- ∀Y :
a- On sending: r+
S′
i = {B.Y }ka .{B.N
α
b }ka (in a receiving
step, the upper-bound is used)
W ′p,F (Y, {B.Y }ka .{B.N
α
b }ka) = W
′
p,F (Y, {B.Y }ka) ⊓
W ′p,F (Y, {B.N
α
b }ka) =
W ′p,F (Y, {B.Y }ka) ⊓⊤ =W
′
p,F (Y, {B.Y }ka) (3.3)
∀Y.{m′ ∈ MGp |∃σ
′ ∈ Γ.m′σ′ = {B.Y }kaσ
′)}
= {({B3.X1}kA3 , σ1), ({X2}kB4 , σ2)} such that:{
σ′1 = {B3 7−→ B,X1 7−→ Y, kA3 7−→ ka}
σ′2 = {X2 7−→ B.Y, kB4 7−→ ka}
W ′p,F (Y, {B.Y }ka)
= {Definition of the lower-bound of the witness-function}
F (Y, ∂[Y ]{B3.X1}kA3σ
′
1) ⊓F (Y, ∂[Y ]{X2}kB4σ
′
2)
= {Setting the static neighborhood}
F (Y, ∂[Y ]{B.X1}kaσ
′
1) ⊓F (Y, ∂[Y ]{X2}kaσ
′
2) =
= {Definition IV.2}
F (X1, ∂[X1]{B.X1}ka) ⊓F (X2, ∂[X2]{X2}ka)
= {Definition IV.1}
F (X1, {B.X1}ka) ⊓ F (X2, {X2}ka)
= {Normal form under homomorphism}
F (X1, {B}ka) ⊓ F (X1, {X1}ka) ⊓ F (X2, {X2}ka)
= {Since F = FEKMAX}
⊤ ⊓ {A} ⊓ {A} = {A} (3.4)
b- On receiving: R−
S′
i = {Y.A}kb (in a receiving step,
the upper-bound is used)
F (Y, ∂[Y ]{Y.A}kb) = F (Y, {Y.A}kb) =
{Normal form under homomorphism}
F (Y, {Y }kb) ⊓ F (Y, {A}kb) = {B} ⊓ ⊤ = {B} (3.5)
3- Conformity with Theorem IV.6:
From (3.0), (3.1) and (3.2) we have:
W ′p,F (N
α
b , {B.Y }ka .{B.N
α
b }ka) = {A} ⊒ pN
α
b q ⊓
F (Nαb , ∂[N
α
b ]{Y.A}kb) = {A,B} (3.6)
From (3.3), (3.4) and (3.5) we have:
W ′p,F (Y, {B.Y }ka .{B.N
α
b }ka) = {A} 6⊒ pY q ⊓
F (Y, ∂[Y ]{Y.A}kb) = pY q ⊓ {B} (3.7)
From (3.7), the messages exchanged in the session S′
i
do not
respect the correctness criterion set in Theorem IV.6. (IV)
From (IV), the messages exchanged in the generalized role
of B do not respect the correctness criterion stated Theorem
IV.6. (V)
C. Results and interpretation
The results of the analysis of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe
protocol under homomorphism are summarized in Table II.
α Role R− r+ Theo.IV.6
1 Nαa A ∅ {N
α
a .A}kb ✔
2 ∀X A {B.Nαa }ka .{B.X}ka A.B.{X}kb ✖
3 ∀Y B {A.Y }kb {B.Y }ka .{B.N
α
b
}ka ✖
4 Nα
b
B {A.Y }kb {B.Y }ka .{B.N
α
b
}ka ✔
Table II: Conformity of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe proto-
col with Theorem IV.6 under cipher homomorphism
From the rows (2) and (3) of Table II, the Needham-
Schroeder-Lowe protocol under the homomorphic property is
rejected by Theorem IV.6. Therefore, we conclude that it may
involve a flaw with respect to secrecy. This flaw is described
by Figure 1. In fact, an intruder can intercept the message
{Nαa .A}kb sent by a regular agent B to a regular agent A.
Then, he concatenates it to the message {I}kb that he creates
by himself. The intruder knows in advance that the resulting
message {Nαa .A}kb .{I}kb is equivalent to {N
α
a .A.I}kb under
the homomorphic property. Then, he initiates a new session
with B and sends him this resulting message. On recpetion,
B understands the string Nαa .A in the received message as
a regular nonce NβI from a regular agent I starting a new
session of the protocol since in a role-based specification this
string corresponds to a variable Y on which he cannot perform
any verification. B replies so by {B.Nαa .A}ki .{B.N
β
b }ki .
The intruder has just to decrypt it to get the secret Nαa
shared between A and B . The bounds of the used witness-
function react well to this scenario and declares the drop
of Y in the generalized role of B. That is because they
base their calculation on the static neighborhood only. This
neighborhood cannot be augmented by the intruder neither
using his capabilities nor using the equational theory. The use
of the normal form that gets rid of all the doubtful atoms
is crucial for an analysis using the witness-functions under
nonempty theories.
A
{Nαa .A}kb
✲I
❄
B
{Nαa .A}kb .{I}kb =ξ {N
α
a .A︸ ︷︷ ︸
N
β
I
.I}kb
✲ I
{B.Nαa .A︸ ︷︷ ︸
N
β
I
}ki .{B.N
β
b }ki
Figure 1: Attack on the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol
under cipher homomorphism
D. Proposal of an amended version
To correct this variant of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe
protocol, we propose the amended version in Table III. In this
version, the nonces Na and Nb are sent back concatenated
with the sender and hashed by a secure hash function, ~ash.
The receiver has just to compare the hashed values with
~ash(sender.sent-nonce) to decide acceptance or rejection.
Believing in the infeasiblility to generate a message from its
digest, the nonces are never derived and the protocol keeps its
secrects.
〈1, A −→ B : {Na.A}kb〉,
〈2, B −→ A : {B.~ash(B.Na)}ka .{B.Nb}ka〉,
〈3, A −→ B : A.{~ash(A.Nb)}kb 〉.
Table III: Amended version of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe
protocol (proposal)
VI. RELATED WORKS
Under nonempty equational theories, our witness-functions
could be compared to the interpretation-functions of
Houmani [16]–[19]. Unfortunately, these functions often fail to
describe flaws inside protocols and simply report the protocol
unsecurity. They yield a high level of false negatives as well
because they are not variable free in output. Contrariwise,
the witness-functions are variable free in output owing to the
derivation in its composition. We believe that our witness-
functions are able to deal with other algebraic properties like
the modular exponentiation property.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we presented how to use the witness-functions
under nonempty equational theories to prove the correctness
of cryptographic protocols with respect to secrecy. The major
contribution is to adjut the witness-functions to deal with
the algebraic properties in the equational theory through a
judicious choice of the normal form on which we apply them.
This normal form is obtained by a careful orietation of the
rewriting system extracted from the theory. Afterwards, we
successfully analyzed the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol
under the homomorphic encryption and we clearly provided
an attack scenario on it. In a future work, we intend to analyze
more protocols under different theories [8]–[11].
NOTICE
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